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Abstract
We apply the idea of relational contracting to a simple problem of regulating a single-product
monopoly with unverifiable (then ex ante not contractible) quality. We model the interaction
between the regulator and the firm as an infinitely repeated game; we observe that there exist
self-enforcing contracts in which the regulator, using her discretionary power on the price (the
contractible variable) can induce the firm to produce the required quality level by leaving it a pos-
itive rent. When players use grim trigger strategies, the optimal self-enforcing contract implies
a distortion from the second best which is greater the more impatient is the firm and the larger
is the effect of the price on the deviation profits. Whenever the equilibrium profits of the static
game are strictly positive, even if the firm were infinitely patient, the optimal contract would not
reach the second-best: it would ensure a quality-adjusted Ramsey condition and, at the same time,
leave positive profits to the firm. We extend the model in a few ways: we find that when players
use stick-and-carrot strategies, with an infinitely patient firm the second-best outcome is reached
even if this implies to punish the deviating firm with negative profits. When instead the regulator
is unable to perfectly monitor the firm’s quality choice, the price/quality pair giving the highest
payoff to the regulator does not directly depend on the firm’s discount factor, which instead affects
the probability of punishment. Our results suggest that, in fixed price regulatory contracts, the
regulatory lag should be shorter the more relevant is the issue of unverifiability, in order to reduce
the reward for opportunistic behavior by the firm.
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1 Introduction
How to regulate quality is an extremely sensitive issue which has been widely
explored since the early days of the economics of regulation (Spence, 1975,
Sheshinsky, 1976). Quality has many distinctive features: for instance, it may
be dicult to observe, it has non-deterministic components, consumers' pref-
erences may be hard to observe. In this paper we focus on unveriability:
unveriability occurs whenever a variable, albeit observable by the parties,
cannot be proven in front of a court and, as a consequence, cannot be con-
tracted upon. In regulated industries it is often the case that some quality
dimensions of the regulated rm's output are not veriable: possible exam-
ples are courtesy and eectiveness of the customer service on technical and
commercial issues, voltage of electricity or actual bandwidth provided in a
particular moment in time, noise of a call, and so forth (see, for instance,
Sappington, 2005).
The regulatory instruments commonly in use to regulate quality, such as
quality standards and links between the quality provided and allowed revenues
or prices, are able to inuence those quality dimensions which are readily
veriable (Waddams Price et al., 2008; De Fraja and Iozzi, 2008) but they
may turn out not to be eective when quality is not veriable. In this paper
we suggest a way of regulating unveriable quality which is based on the idea
of relational contracts (Hviid, 2000; Levin, 2003; MacLeod, 2007).
Relational contracts are informal agreements and unwritten codes of
conduct that are sustained by the value of future relationships, and are appli-
cable even in the cases when the outcome of a relationship is based on some
unveriable variables. These agreements are typically sustained by the discre-
tionary power that one of the parties has on some court-enforceable contract
terms. This type of contracts ts in naturally with the nature of the interac-
tion between the regulator and the regulated rm. These two parties typically
interact repeatedly over time, and are both well informed on many variables
aecting the outcome of the relationship, even though at least part of this
knowledge cannot be used (or it is very expensive to use) in contracts or in
front of a court. Also, the regulator enjoys quite a large discretion in making
the decisions which aect the outcome of the relationship (Cowan, 2002).1
1Beesley and Littlechild (1989) clearly illustrates this point. On p 458, they state that
\when setting X [which, under price cap regulation, is the annual rate of allowed price
change, i.e. the parameter limiting the price level and dynamics (our note)] initially there
are many degrees of freedom. [. . . ] There is nothing unique, optimal, or mechanical about
the initial choice of X. When X is reset, there are signicantly fewer degrees of freedom.
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We analyse a very simple problem of regulating a single-product mo-
nopolistic rm when there is full information by all parties and the regulatory
instrument is a xed-price contract; as described above, quality is endogenous
and observable, but not veriable. We model the interaction between the reg-
ulator and the rm as an innitely repeated game in which the regulated price
can be used by the regulator as an incentive device to enforce the mandated
level of quality. We observe that, under grim trigger strategies, provided both
players are suciently patient, there exist self-enforcing regulatory contracts
in which the rm prefers to produce the quality mandated by the regulator,
while the regulator chooses to leave the rm a positive rent as a reward to
its quality choice. We then proceed to characterise the self-enforcing contract
which maximises the regulator's objective function. We show that, under nor-
mal circumstances, this contract implies a distortion from the second best.
This distortion is greater the more impatient is the rm and the larger is the
(marginal) eect of the contractual price on the prots the rm would make
by deviating from the oered contract. Whenever the equilibrium of the stage
game entails positive prots, even if the rm were innitely patient, the opti-
mal contract would grant positive prots to the rm; however, it would satisfy
the typical Ramsey condition of tangency between the isowelfare and the iso-
prot. We also show that, at the optimal contract, the distortion (relatively
to the second best) only aects the veriable variable, i.e., the price: the man-
dated (unveriable) quality always obeys a second best condition. To further
illustrate this price distortion, we show that, under standard assumptions on
the nature of the consumers' and regulator's preferences, the price in the opti-
mal contract obeys a Ramsey-like inverse elasticity rule; the optimal mark-up
depends not only on the demand elasticity, but also on the discount factor and
the marginal eect of price on both deviation prots and social welfare.
To check for the robustness of our result, we extend our analysis in three
dierent directions. First, we allow players to use stick-and-carrot strategies,
which clearly allow harsher punishments in case of deviation. In this setting,
we nd that, with an innitely patient rm, there exist contracts that are
able to enforce the second best. These, however, entail negative punishment
prots. Indeed, were the regulator unable to induce negative prots to the rm
in some periods (as it is normally posited in most of the regulation literature),
the impossibility to reach the second-best would also carry over to this case
in which the regulator uses a more \sophisticated" type of strategy. Second,
we investigate the case of a regulator being unable to perfectly monitor the
Nevertheless, there invariably are degrees of freedom open to the regulator". Littlechild was
the Director General of OFFER, the UK energy regulator, from 1989 to 1998.
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rm's quality choice. The socially optimal probability of punishment increases
with the deviation prots, while it is decreasing in the discount factor and
the contractual prots. The contract giving the regulator the highest payo
implies a distortion with respect to the second best dependent only on the
single-period gain the rms obtains from the deviation. Third, we analyse the
case of quality having two dimensions, one veriable and one not, and conrm
that the optimal contract entails a distortion only on veriable variables (here,
price and one of the quality components).
Our contribution is clearly related to the large literature on quality reg-
ulation (Spence, 1975; Sheshinsky, 1976 and, more recently, Weisman, 2005;
Currier, 2007; De Fraja and Iozzi, 2008 and Auray et al., 2011), where, how-
ever, the issue of unveriability arises only in few papers (see, for instance,
Lewis and Sappington, 1992; Laont and Tirole, 1993 and Dalen, 1997); to
the best of our knowledge, this is the rst attempt of dealing with relational
contracts within a framework of pricing regulation with unveriable quality.
This paper makes a contribution also to the issue of optimal regulatory lag
(Armstrong et al., 1995), when one interprets the discount factor as resulting
from the frequency of interactions between the players. Our result suggests
that the frequency of the price revisions should be higher the more relevant
is the issue of unveriability. This is because a shorter regulatory lag reduces
the reward for opportunistic behaviour by the rm and allows the regulator
to elicit \better" price and quality pairs. A similar indication comes also in
the case of procurement contracts, which our paper contributes to study once
one focuses on the case of repeated purchases and reads the discount factor as
depending also on the probability of continuation of the contract: our results
suggest that a shorter contract length and some form of favouritism towards
the incumbent rm when re-tendering (future) contracts increases the value of
adhering to the oered (current) contract, and results in a price and quality
pair which is closer to the one most socially preferred.2
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the
model. The equilibria of the static and the dynamic game in our basic setting
are characterized in Section 3. Section 4 contains some extensions of our
analysis and robustness checks of our results. Section 5 concludes.
2Related papers on repeated procurement with non-contractible elements are Albano et
al. (2011), Calzolari and Spagnolo (2009), Doni (2006), Iossa and Rey (2010), Kim (1998),
Kremer et al. (2006) and Sasaki and Strausz (2008).
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2 The Basic Model
We analyse an innite horizon game in which two parties, a regulator and a
monopolistic rm, interact at dates t = 0; 1; : : : ;1. Let  be the discount
factor, common to the rm and the regulator.
The monopolist produces one good, whose demand is given by x(p; q),
where p denotes the price of the good and q its quality; we assume that p 2 R+
and q 2 Q  [q ; q+]  R++. The demand function is continuous and twice
dierentiable (this applies to all other functions we introduce in this Section).
Demand satises xp(p; q) < 0 and xq(p; q) > 0 whenever x(p; q) > 0, where
subscripts denote partial derivatives.
The rm's technology is described by the cost function c(x; q) which
satises, plausibly, cx(x; q) > 0 and cq(x; q) > 0. To avoid corner solutions, we
assume that limq!q  cq(x; q) = 0 and that limq!q+ c(x; q) = +1: a marginal
increase of quality is costless when quality is at its minimum and is innitely
costly when quality is maximal. The rm's prots are therefore given by
(p; q) = x(p; q)p  c(x(p; q); q).
The regulator's objective function is given by v(p; q) which is simply
assumed to satisfy the following conditions: vp(p; q)  0, and vq(p; q) > 0.3
In most of the paper, we analyse a dynamic game which is an innite
repetition of the following sequential stage game:
1. the regulator makes an oer F  fp0; q0g in which she asks the rm to
produce a good of quality q0 and sets the market price p0 at which the
good has to be sold;
2. the rm chooses whether or not to accept the contract: if the rm accepts
the contract, the game proceeds to the following stage; otherwise, it does
not produce, reservation payos ~ and ~V are collected and the game ends;
3. the rm chooses the actual quality level q00; at the end of this stage the
regulator observes q00, and the payos v(p0; q00) and (p0; q00) are realized.
We assume that the reservation value for the regulator is low enough to make
her always prefer that the rm undertakes production in each period. This is
a standard hypothesis in the regulation literature, motivated by the specic
3At this stage of the paper, we purposely do not impose any further restrictions on the
consumers' and regulator's preferences. The analysis then applies to the standard case of
an utilitarian benevolent regulator (as it is the case in Section 3.3) but it is also valid, for
instance, when the regulator has some distributional (Feldstein, 1972 and, for an application
to price cap regulation Iozzi et al., 2002, and Valentini, 2006) or environmental concerns
(Oates and Portney, 2003), or she is captured by the regulated rm (Stigler, 1971).
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nature of the industries subject to regulation. Its immediate consequence is
that the second stage of the game can be safely ignored in the rest of the
analysis, since the rm will never choose to reject the oer and produce a null
quantity for one period.
We analyse a repeated game of perfect monitoring. However, despite
the realisation of price and quality is fully observable by both players, quality
is not enforceable in a court of law. Then, the regulator cannot impose any
directly enforceable penalty on the rm if she observes q0 6= q00.
Before proceeding into the analysis of the game, we state:
Denition 1. Let the following denitions hold:
a) for any price p, let bq(p)  argmax
q
(p; q) and b(p)  (p; bq(p));
b) let p0 be the smallest price such that b(p0) = 0.
In words, bq(p) is the quality level that delivers the highest prot to the
rm for any possible price. We assume it exists and is unique. Similarly, b(p)
is the prot the rm can make, for any given price, when it optimally chooses
its quality. Also, p0 is the price which ensures that the rm obtains zero prots
when it freely chooses its quality level, given this price. If more than one such
price exist, p0 denotes the smallest, that is, the one that gives the highest
value of v(p; bq(p)) amongst those satisfying the zero-prot condition stated in
the denition.
We also state:
Denition 2. Let pR and qR be the pair of price and quality which solves the
following problem:
max
p;q
v(p; q) (1)
s.t. (p; q)  0
In words, pR and qR is the Ramsey price and quality pair which max-
imises the (static) regulator's objective function, subject to a non-negativity
constraint on the rm's prots. It is easy to show that, at pR and qR, the
following holds:
vp
 
pR; qR

vq (pR; qR)
=
p
 
pR; qR

q (pR; qR)
; (2)
and that, at pR and qR, the non-negativity constraint holds as an equality. We
assume pR and qR to exist, be unique and dierent from pM and qM , where
pM and qM are the prot maximising price and quality.
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Figure 1: The static game.
Figure 1 illustrates these Denitions. It depicts the price-quality carte-
sian plane; the solid curves are the isoprot lines and the dashed curves are
the isowelfare lines, upward sloping because welfare is increasing in quality
and decreasing in price.4 The pair

pM ; qM
	
is the unconstrained prot max-
imising price and quality pair, and

pR; qR
	
is the second best pair: at this
point, the zero-prot isoprot line is tangent to the isowelfare map. At prices
p0 and p1, the rm, when freely choosing its quality level, selects bq (p0) and,
respectively, bq (p1): at the price and quality pair fp0; bq(p0)g the rm makes
zero prots.
4In the Figure, isowelfare lines are drawn under the hypothesis that the v(p; q) is quasi-
concave. This needs not be the case and all our results are valid even when v(:) has a
dierent nature. With consumers with quasi-linear preferences and a benevolent regulator
(as in Section 3.3), quasi-concavity of v(p; q) would reect the quite natural (but not always
satised) property of consumers' preferences that their willingness to pay for increases in
quality is higher when quality is low than when quality is already high (for further discussion,
see De Fraja and Iozzi, 2008).
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3 Equilibrium
3.1 The static game
This Subsection characterises the equilibrium of the stage game. This is in-
teresting not only in itself, but also as its features will play an important role
in the characterisation of the equilibrium of the dynamic game.
In the static game, if quality is not veriable, the regulator cannot
enforce the second best quality level. Since the regulator can only observe but
not punish any choice of quality other than the mandated level, we are back
in the context of price regulation with endogenous quality, rstly analysed by
Spence (1975). It is then straightforward to characterize the equilibrium of
the stage game described above. In the last stage of the game, for any price
mandated by the regulator, the rm chooses the prot maximizing quality
level bq(p). Anticipating this, in the rst stage the regulator makes an oer
FS  pS; bq(pS)	, where pS comes as the solution of the following problem:5
max
p
v(p; q) (3)
s.t. (p; q)  0
q = bq(p):
The properties of this equilibrium price are described in the following Propo-
sition:
Proposition 1 The equilibrium price pS oered by the regulator in the stage
game has the following features:
 pS = p0 whenever  vp
 
pS; bq  pS > vq  pS; bq  pS bqp  pS, which im-
plies b  pS = 0, and
 pS > p0 whenever  vp
 
pS; bq  pS = vq  pS; bq  pS bqp  pS, which im-
plies b(pS) > 0.
Proof To solve problem (3), we set up the Lagrangean incorporating the
second constraint
L = v(p; bq(p)) + b(p):
5We take bq  pS as the quality level included in the oer FS only for the sake of de-
niteness; indeed, any quality level could be part of this oer because, in this static setting,
the regulator anticipates that the rm will always choose its prot maximizing quality level
and that she cannot prevent or punish this behaviour.
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FOCs are:
Lp = vp
 
pS; bq  pS+ vq  pS; bq  pS bqp  pS+ bp  pS = 0;
L = b  pS  0;   0; b  pS = 0:
If  = 0, then b  pS  0 and vp  pS; bqp  pS + vq  pS; bq  pS bqp  pS = 0.
Instead, if  > 0, then b  pS = 0 and vp  pS; bqp  pS+vq  pS; bq  pS bqp  pS+
bp  pS = 0. Since b(p) is monotonically increasing in p whenever p < pM ,
this establishes the result.
Proposition 1 illustrates that the optimal static oer is such that the
rm may make strictly positive prots.6 When the optimal oer implies strictly
positive prots, the non-negativity constraint is slack; the regulator sets the
price to equalize the (negative) marginal direct eect on welfare with the
(positive) marginal indirect eect, due to an increase in the quality provision
{ i.e.  vp
 
pS; bq(pS) = vq  pS; bq(pS) bqp  pS. Notice that, in this case, a
marginal increase in the price necessarily induces an increase in the quality
provided by the rm. On the other hand, when the optimal oer implies zero
prots, the regulator would prefer to reduce the price because this has a direct
eect on social welfare which outplays the indirect eect caused by the induced
change in quality; however, the non-negativity constraint on the rm's prots
limits a further price reduction. Notice that in this case, at the equilibrium,
the sign of the marginal change in quality due to a marginal price change {
i.e. bqp  pS { is indeterminate.
The equilibrium of the stage game is illustrated in Figure 2. In both
panels, the locus aa0 illustrates the optimal quality choices for the dierent
price levels, i.e. bq(p). Taking this as a constraint, the regulator chooses her
optimal one-shot price pS to maximise social welfare. Depending on the local
relative slope of iso-welfare,  vp(p
S ;bq(pS))
vq(pS ;bq(pS)) , and of bq(pS), the optimal price may
be given by a tangency condition between the isowelfare and the locus aa0, as
in the left panel, or may be a corner solution, as in the right panel. Clearly,
given the many possible shapes the locus aa0 can take on, restrictions are
necessary to ensure that the solution to the regulator's problem is unique or,
more restrictively, exists altogether.
In the Figure, the grey shaded areas illustrate the price-quality com-
binations which are a Pareto improvement relatively to the static equilibrium
6Note that the solution to problem (3) need not be unique. In case of multiple solutions,
for reasons that will be clearer thereafter, we select pS as the solution giving the rm the
lowest prot. Also, to avoid unrewarding solutions, throughout the paper we assume bp  pS
to be strictly positive.
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Figure 2: The optimal static contract.
and can therefore be contracted on relationally. The nature of these contracts
and the characteristics of the optimal contract are discussed in the next Sub-
section.
3.2 The dynamic game
In this Subsection, we study the dynamic game, given by an innite repetition
of the sequential stage game just discussed. We illustrate that a relational con-
tract ensures that both players obtain a payo higher than the one they would
get in a static setting and, assuming that players use grim trigger strategies,
show the nature of the price and quality pair which are part of the contract
that maximises the regulator's objective function.
With unveriable quality, a regulatory relational contract is a strategy
prole such that in each period the regulator makes an oer FC  pC ; qC	
and the rm chooses to adhere to this oer. This regulatory relational contract
is self-enforcing if the strategy prole is a perfect equilibrium of the repeated
game.
A game of this sort has multiple equilibria. Indeed, the Folk theorem
ensures that any pair of payos which are feasible and individually rational
are the payos of some subgame perfect equilibrium, provided that  is su-
ciently high.7 We concentrate on equilibria resulting from the adoption of the
7Sorin (1995) proves that the Folk theorem, proved by Fudenberg and Maskin (1986)
for simultaneous repeated games, also applies to sequential repeated games provided that
full dimensionality condition (FDC) holds. This requires that the convex hull of the set of
the feasible payo vectors of the stage game must have dimension equal to the number of
players, or equivalently a nonempty interior. FDC is clearly satised in our model. Abreu
et al. (1994) and Wen (1994, 2002) further weaken these requirements.
9
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following grim trigger strategies:
 regulator: the regulator begins the game by making to the rm an
oer FC . In the following repetitions of the game, she keeps making
this oer as long as the history of the game is such that no price/quality
pair dierent from

pC ; qC
	
was previously chosen; otherwise, she reverts
indenitely to her equilibrium strategy in the stage game;
 rm: the rm chooses the quality qC as long as the history of the game
is such that no price or quality dierent from pC and qC was previously
chosen; otherwise, it reverts indenitely to its equilibrium strategy in
the stage game.
Notice the somehow dierent nature of the two strategies, due to the
sequential nature of the stage game; while the regulator may react to a quality
level dierent from qC only in the following period this choice has been made,
an oer dierent from FC oered by the regulator is immediately observed by
the rm and triggers the rm's reaction in the same period it is made.
Our pair of trigger strategies forms a subgame perfect equilibrium of
our game, for an adequate choice of FC (so that the per period equilibrium
payo for each player exceeds its equilibrium payo in the stage game) and
for suciently patient parties ( is close enough to 1). Subgame perfection is
ensured by the absence of protable one-shot deviations (Mailath and Samuel-
son, 2006), where a one-shot deviation from strategy  is a strategy which,
at time t, prescribes a dierent action than  for a unique history, but which
plays identical to  in every period other than t.
Clearly, there are many oers FC supporting a trigger strategies equi-
librium; our next aim is to characterise the oer which is preferred by the
regulator. We let F  fp; qg be such an oer; it comes as the solution to
the following problem:
max
pC ;qC
1X
t=0
tv(pC ; qC) =
1
1   v(p
C ; qC) (4)
s.t.
1
1  
 
pC ; qC
  b  pC+ 
1  b  pS (5)
where constraint (5) is the rm's incentive compatibility constraint (ICC,
henceforth). The maximisation problem deserves two brief comments: rst,
an incentive compatibility constraint for the regulator is not needed, since
any choice of the regulator dierent from the equilibrium contract is immedi-
ately observed and punished by the rm, and it is therefore not protable for
10
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the regulator. Also, constraint (5) implies that the single-period participation
constraint for the rm holds; this constraint often features dynamic regulatory
problems of this kind.8
We can now state the main result of the Section:
Proposition 2 When players use grim trigger strategies, the price and quality
pair fp; qg solving problem (4)-(5) has the following properties:
 it satises the following conditions:
vp (p
; q)
vq (p; q)
=
p (p
; q)  (1  )bp (p)
q (p; q)
(6)
and
 (p; q) = (1  )b (p) + b  pS ; (7)
 the optimal contractual quality is always set to satisfy the static quality-
adjusted Ramsey condition, given the contractual price.
Proof The Lagrangian of problem (4)-(5) is:
L =
1
1   v
 
pC ; qC

+ 

1
1  
 
pC ; qC
  b(pC)  
1  b(pS)

: (8)
FOCs are:
Lp = vp (p
; q) +  [p (p; q)  (1  )bp (p)] = 0; (9)
Lq = vq (p
; q) + q (p; q) = 0; (10)
L =
1
1  (p
; q)  b(p)  
1  b  pS  0;   0; L = 0: (11)
From (9) and (10), it follows that  > 0; if this were not the case, we would
have that vp (p
; q) = vq (p; q) = 0, which clearly contradicts the hypothesis
that the rst best is out of reach. Therefore, L = 0 in (11), which gives (7).
Also, dividing (9) by (10), we get (6). The second part of the Proposition
8Notice that we do not impose here a single period non-negativity constraint. Instead,
the fact that the rm never gets non-negative prots follows directly from the fact that the
punishment phase is nothing but an innite repetition of the equilibrium of the static game;
this implies that, in case of a deviation, the rm is punished with the (always non-negative)
equilibrium prots of the static game. More technically, a single period non-negativity
constraint is not assumed but it is implied by constraint (5) and the fact that b  pS  0.
For more on this, see the discussion at the end of Sect. 4.1.
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is established by simply observing that (10) is identical to the corresponding
FOC obtained solving problem (1).
Conditions (6) and (7) dene the optimal equilibrium price and quality
pair and illustrate the way it departs from the second best. Condition (6)
diers from the quality-adjusted Ramsey condition (2) because of the second
term in the numerator of the RHS; this depends, rst, on the discount factor
and, second, on the marginal eect on the deviation prots of a change in the
contractual price. To interpret (6), note that, in the quality-adjusted Ramsey
condition of tangency (2), the marginal rate of substitution between price and
quality is equated between the regulator and the rm. On the contrary, here,
the regulator sets a price lower than the one which would ensure the tangency
between isoprot and isowelfare. This is because it takes into account that
the higher is the price oered, the higher are the prots the rm makes, at
that price, if it fails to deliver the mandated quality. This, and the discount
factor, which tells how \impatient" is the rm, determines the change in the
rm's incentive to deviate following a change in the price. The greater is this
incentive the smaller is the regulator's willingness to substitute away price with
quality. Only if the rm were innitely patient, the optimal contract would
correspond to a tangency condition between the iso-welfare and the iso-prot,
as described by the standard quality-adjusted Ramsey condition (2).
On the other hand, condition (7) determines the level of the prots the
regulator has to ensure to the rm. These increase not only with the prots
the rm obtains when it fails to deliver the mandated quality level { i.e. the
\deviation" prots b(p) {, but also with the prots the rm obtains in case of
reversal to the static equilibrium { i.e. the \punishment" prots b  pS. When
these latter prots are strictly positive, even if the rm were innitely patient,
also the optimal contract must ensure the rm strictly positive prots. In
other words, as  approaches 1, condition (6) approaches the quality-adjusted
Ramsey condition (2), but this tangency condition would not occur on the
zero-prot isoprot.
Finally, the second part of Proposition 2 illustrates that only the price,
and not the quality, is \distorted" relatively to the second best to give the
rm incentives to cooperate and, at the same time, minimise the distortion.
Quality is instead at a level that satises a second best condition. Notice,
however, that this does not imply that the optimal contractual quality is set
at the quality-adjusted Ramsey level; since typically pR 6= p, this aects the
second best condition giving the quality required by the regulator.
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3.3 Relational Ramsey pricing
In this Subsection, we draw a closer connection between our results and the
established benchmark of Ramsey prices. To ensure an immediate compara-
bility with the extant literature, we use standard assumptions on the nature
of consumers' and regulator's preferences and then reformulate our results.9
Assume that the rm's output is demanded by L consumers with quasi-
linear indirect utility given by `(p; q)+ y`, ` = 1; : : : ; L, where y` is consumer
`'s income. Because of the additive formulation, there are no income eects:
individual `'s demand is simply given by x` (p; q), and aggregate demand is
given by the sum of individual demands: x (p; q) =
P
` x
` (p; q). Assume
also that the regulator is a benevolent utilitarian. Her objective function
v(p; q) is the unweighted sum of individuals' utility: v(p; q) =
P
` 
`(p; q), after
normalising away total income. The quasi-linear nature of the individuals'
preferences implies that Roy's identity can be written as vp(p; q) =  x(p; q).
Denoting with (p; q) the price elasticity of the demand for good x, we
can then state the following Proposition:
Proposition 3 Assume consumers have quasi-linear preferences and the reg-
ulator is a benevolent utilitarian. When players use grim trigger strategies,
the optimal contractual price satises
p   cx(x (p; q) ; q)
p
=
1
 (p; q)

  1

  (1  ) bp (p)
x (p; q)

: (12)
The Proposition comes from the use of Roy's identity in the FOCs of
problem (4)-(5) and a simple rearranging, and the proof is therefore omitted.
It says that optimal contract entails a price which obeys a typical inverse{
elasticity rule. The basic structure of the mark-up is very similar to the case
of traditional Ramsey prices, apart for the obvious dierence of a Lagrange
multiplier giving now the shadow cost of the rm's incentive compatibility
constraint, rather than the one of non-negativity constraint, as with the stan-
dard Ramsey case. The main novelty is that the mark-up is now aected also
by the rm's incentive to deviate, as illustrated by the rm's discount factor
and the derivative w.r.to prots of the deviation prots. The discount factor
is positively related to the mark-up, illustrating that the more patient is the
9See the seminal contributions of Baumol and Bradford (1970) and Feldstein (1972), and
the ensuing literature. See Bos (1981) for a comprehensive treatment of quasi-linearity of
consumers' preferences and its consequences on the properties of the objective function of
a benevolent regulator.
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rm, the smaller is the rm's incentive to deviate and then the higher can be
the contractual price. On the other hand, the price-cost margin is lower the
higher is bp (p; q), that is the larger is the eect of a price increase on the
gain the rm makes when deviating from the oered contract. Clearly, the
mark-up is also negatively aected by the eects that the contractual price
has on consumers' welfare, as given by  vp (p; q) = x (p; q).
3.4 Contract length and probability of continuation
Propositions 2 and 3 illustrate the importance of the discount factor in shaping
the nature of the optimal contract: in particular, they illustrate that the opti-
mal contract delivers an outcome which diers the more from the second best
the smaller is the discount factor. To fully comprehend the implications of this
result and to relate our results to the extant literature, it is useful to further
discuss the nature of the discount factor. Indeed, standard textbook analysis
shows that  reects not only the players' intertemporal preferences, but also
other circumstances, such as frequency of interactions and the probability of
continuation of the game in the following periods.
The frequency of interactions positively aects the value of the discount
factor, since a high value of  is associated to a low value of the per-period
interest rate. In our setting, an increase in the frequency of interactions is
equivalent to a reduction in the time between two successive price (and qual-
ity) reviews, something which is normally referred to as regulatory lag. The
existing literature illustrates that, when the rm's cost is endogenous, there
is a trade-o in setting the regulatory lag: the longer is the regulatory lag,
the higher is the incentive the rm has to undertake cost-reducing eorts,
but also the greater the allocative ineciency arising from the rm's exces-
sive prots (Armstrong et al., 1994; and Armstrong et al., 1995). Our results
suggest the existence of a further determinant in setting the regulatory lag in
regulatory settings in which unveriability plays a role. Since our equilibrium
outcome becomes closer to a quality-adjusted Ramsey solution as  increases,
a short regulatory lag increases the regulator's ability to induce a second best
outcome. This is because a short regulatory lag causes small gains from the
deviation from the oered contract, thereby reducing the need to increase the
rm's prots to induce it to deliver the required quality.
On the other hand, our game is formally equivalent to another game
of indeterminate length in which  not only reects the players' intertemporal
preferences and the frequency of interactions, but also the probability of con-
tinuation of the game in the following periods. This allows to interpret our
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model as a model of dynamic regulation in which, at some moment in time,
the incumbent rm may lose the contract or can be imposed a contract of
dierent and unknown nature. In other words, our  can be reinterpreted as a
measure of the regulatory risk faced by the rm. Our results then show that
the greater is this regulatory risk, the larger is the distance to the second best
of the optimal regulatory relational contract.
The interpretation of the discount factor as incorporating the proba-
bility of continuation of the game allows also to use our model to analyse the
case of procurement with repeated purchases, in which the incumbent rm
may lose the contract to a rival, possibly because of some (here, unspecied)
competitive tendering procedure. Our results on the frequency of interactions
are then fully consistent with Calzolari and Spagnolo (2009) (see also Spag-
nolo, 2012), who analyse a model of repeated competitive procurement with
unveriable quality. They nd that a reduction in the contract length (i.e.,
more frequent interactions), in increasing the probability of collusion (see also
Kremer et al., 2006, and Sasaki and Strausz, 2008), increases the value of the
contract to the rm and, therefore, induces it to deliver a \good" level of the
non-contractible variable.
Also, our paper illustrates that there is scope for some favouritism to-
wards the incumbent rm when re-tendering the contract, which increases the
probability of continuation of the long-term relationship with the incumbent.
This increases the value of adhering to the regulator's oer and results in a
price and quality pair which is closer to the second best. Our results are
then in line with Laont and Tirole (1988), who analyse a two-period model
of natural monopoly and second-sourcing. They nd that, when cost-saving
investment are transferable but not observable, the regulated rm has insuf-
cient incentive to invest since its investment may benet the rival in the
following period. Then, in the auction to choose the contractor in the second
stage of the game, the regulator may nd it optimal to favour the incumbent
to increase its incentive to invest in the rst stage.
4 Extensions and robustness checks
In this Subsection, we consider three dierent extensions to our basic model.
We start by assuming that players use stick-and-carrot strategies, rather than
grim trigger strategy. Second, we look at the case of the regulator being unable
to perfectly monitor the rm's quality choice. Last, we investigate the case in
which the quality of the good produced by the regulated rm has two dierent
15
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dimensions, one veriable and one unveriable.10
4.1 Stick and carrot strategies
In this Section, we characterise the equilibrium resulting from players using
stick-and-carrot strategies. In the previous Section, the use of grim trigger
strategies constrained the punishment payo to be no lower than the static
game equilibrium payo; this limitation was a potential explanation of the
impossibility to reach the second best even with an innitely patient rm.
Therefore, in this Subsection we explore whether this impossibility can be
overcome by allowing harsher punishments, as it is indeed the case with stick-
and-carrot strategies. These strategies are also somewhat more palatable in
a regulatory context, since they allow for a punishment of limited length,
avoiding the unrealistic possibility of an everlasting punishment.
We concentrate on players adopting the following stick-and-carrot strate-
gies:11
 regulator: the regulator begins the game by making an oer FC 
pC ; qC
	
and keeps making this oer as long as the history of the game
is such that no price/quality pair dierent from

pC ; qC
	
was previously
chosen. Alternatively, the regulator oers FP  pP ; qP	 for T periods;
if during these T periods the price/quality pair

pP ; qP
	
is observed, in
period T + 1 the regulator reverts to the initial choice of FC . Other-
wise, if during any of these T periods any price/quality pair dierent
from

pP ; qP
	
was chosen, the regulator oers again FP for the next T
periods;
 rm: the rm chooses quality qC as long as the history of the game is
such that no price and quality dierent from pC and qC was previously
chosen. Alternatively, if it observes a price dierent from pC , the rm
chooses bq(p) in the same period and then qP for the following T periods;
if during these T periods no price and quality dierent from pP and qP
is chosen, in period T + 1 the rm reverts to the initial choice of qC .
Otherwise, if during any of these T periods a price dierent from pP is
chosen, the rm rst chooses bq(p) in the same period and then qP for
the following T periods.
10In these Section, we only present the assumptions of the model that vary with respect
to the basic model.
11See Abreu (1986) and (1988), and Abreu et al. (1986) for a formal discussion.
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To analyse our problem, we rst need to introduce some further no-
tation. Let P be the present value of rm's future prots during and after
a phase of punishment for a deviation, assuming that no deviation occurs
during the T periods of the punishment phase so that, after this phase, the
\cooperative" prots are re-established. Formally, it is given by
P 
T 1X
t=0
t
 
pP ; qP

+
1X
t=T
t
 
pC ; qC

=
1  T
1   
 
pP ; qP

+
T
1  
 
pC ; qC

: (13)
We also let DP be the present value of rm's future prots following a devi-
ation from the punishment phase. Formally, it is given by
DP  b  pP + P : (14)
We can then write the incentive compatibility constraint, which ensures that
the rm prefers to adhere to the contract, in the following recursive way
1
1  
 
pC ; qC
  b(p) + P ; (15)
also, the constraint ensuring that the rm does not have an incentive to deviate
from the punishment path takes the following form12
P  DP : (16)
Similarly, on the regulator's side, let V P be the present value of the reg-
ulator's future payos during and after a phase of punishment for a deviation,
assuming that no deviation occurs during the T periods of the punishment
phase so that, after this phase, the \cooperative" payos are re-established.
Formally, it is given by
V P 
T 1X
t=0
tv
 
pP ; qP

+
1X
t=T
tv
 
pC ; qC

=
1  T
1   v
 
pP ; qP

+
T
1   v
 
pC ; qC

: (17)
12Because of the sequential nature of the stage game, the result of Abreu (1988) on optimal
penal codes does not necessarily apply here, as explained by Mailath et al. (2008).
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We also let V DP be the present value of the regulator's future payos following
a deviation from the punishment phase. Formally, it is given by
V DP  v  pS; bq  pS+ V P : (18)
where, in writing the regulator's payo following a deviation, we use the fact
that the best possible price anticipating the rm's best reply is given by the
solution to the static problem (3).
We are now in the position to check that, provided that she has no
incentive to deviate from the subsequent punishment, the regulator has not
incentive to deviate from the oered contract. To see this, write the regulator's
incentive compatibility constraint
1
1   v
 
pC ; qC
  v  pS; bq  pS+ V P (19)
which, using (17), becomes
1
1   v
 
pC ; qC
 
v
 
pS; bq  pS+  1  T
1   v
 
pP ; qP

+
T
1   v
 
pC ; qC

: (20)
Comparing period by period both sides of the inequality, it is easy to see
that sucient conditions for (20) to hold are that the oered contract delivers
higher payos than the optimal static contract and the punishment contract,
two conditions that must be clearly satised by any equilibrium contract. It
remains to formalise the condition which ensures that the regulator has no
incentive to deviate from the punishment phase. Formally, this is simply
V P  V DP (21)
which, after using (17) and (18), becomes
(1  T ) v  pP ; qP + Tv  pC ; qC  v  pS; bq  pS : (22)
Since v
 
pC ; qC

is always greater than v
 
pS; bq  pS, this inequality is satised
provided that v
 
pP ; qP

is not too small relatively to v
 
pS; bq  pS and/or T
is not too low.
Using the one-shot deviation principle (Mailath and Samuelson, 2006),
it is easy to check that our pair of stick-and-carrot strategies forms a subgame
perfect equilibrium of our game, provided that FC , FP and T are chosen so
that (15), (16) and (22) are satised.
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Clearly, there are many combinations of pC ; qC ; pP ; qP and T that sup-
port such an equilibrium. In principle, it could be possible to single out among
them the combination which maximises the regulator's payo by simply solv-
ing the problem of maximising the discounted present value of the regulator's
payo subject to constraints (15), (16) and (22). To our purposes, it is how-
ever sucient to solve the simpler problem of nding the optimal price and
quality pair for the \cooperative" phase, which we denote with p and q, and
simply provide the conditions on pP , qP and T for the optimal p and q to be
an equilibrium. This problem can be formally stated as follows
max
pC ;qC
1X
t=0
tv
 
pC ; qC

=
1
1   v
 
pC ; qC

(23)
s.t.
1  T+1
1   
 
pC ; qC
  b(pC) + 1  T
1   
 
pP ; qP

(24)

 
pP ; qP
  1
1  T b  pP   T1  T   pC ; qC (25)
(1  T ) v  pP ; qP + Tv  pC ; qC  v  pS; bq  pS (26)
where we take pP , qP and T as given. In this problem, the rst two constraints
come simply from using in (15) and (16) the denitions of D and P given
in (13) and (14). We can then state the main result of this Subsection:
Proposition 4 When players use stick-and-carrot and  ! 1, the optimal
contract satises the second best conditions vp(p
;q)
vq(p;q) =
p(p;q)
q(p;q) and (p
; q) =
0, provided that T    b(p)
(pP ;qP )
and 
 
pP ; qP

< 0.
Proof In solving the problem, we initially ignore constraint (26), which will
be checked to hold once our solutions are found. The Lagrangean of the
regulator's maximization problem is as follows
L =
1
1   v
 
pC ; qC

+ 

1  T+1
1   
 
pC ; qC
  b(pC)  1  T
1   
 
pP ; qP

+


 
pP ; qP
  1
1  T b  pP + T1  T   pC ; qC

:
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FOCs are given by
Lp =
1
1   vp(p
; q) + 

1  T+1
1   p(p
; q)  bp(p)
+ 
T
1  T p(p
; q) = 0; (27)
Lq =
1
1   vq(p
; q) + 
1  T+1
1   q(p
; q) + 
T
1  T q(p
; q) = 0; (28)
L =
1  T+1
1   (p
; q)  b(p)  1  T
1   (p
P ; qP )  0;
  0; L   = 0; (29)
L = 
 
pP ; qP
  1
1  T b  pP + T1  T (p; q)  0;
  0; L   = 0: (30)
Assume rst that  =  = 0. From (27) and (28), we have vp(p
; q) =
vq(p
; q) = 0, clearly inconsistent with a second best situation.
Assume then  > 0 and  = 0. Using these into (27) and (28), and
rearranging, it gives
vp(p
; q)
vq(p; q)
=
p(p
; q)
q(p; q)
  (1  )
(1  T+1)
bp(p)
q(p; q)
: (31)
We now take the limit for  ! 1 of this ratio and of (29) and (30) to get
vp(p
; q)
vq(p; q)
=
p(p
; q)
q(p; q)
  1
T + 1
bp(p)
q(p; q)
; (32)
(p; q)(T + 1)  b(p)  T(pP ; qP ) = 0; (33)
(p; q)  b  pP  : (34)
From (33) and (34) we get
T  b(p)  b  pP b (pP )   (pP ; qP ) : (35)
Notice that (32) illustrates that the Ramsey-like tangency condition (2) could
only be obtained when T = 1, something which however is not consistent
with (35).
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Assume now  > 0 and  > 0. Using these into (27) and (28), and
rearranging, it gives
vp(p
; q)
vq(p; q)
=
p(p
; q)
q(p; q)
+
(1  )
(1  T+1) + T (1  )
bp(p)
q(p; q)
: (36)
We now take the limit for  ! 1 of this ratio and of (29) and (30) to get
vp(p
; q)
vq(p; q)
=
p(p
; q)
q(p; q)
+

(T + 1) + 
bp(p)
q(p; q)
; (37)
(p; q)(T + 1)  b(p)  T  pP ; qP  = 0; (38)
(p; q) = b  pP  : (39)
From (38) and (39) we get
T =
b(p)  b  pP b(pP )   (pP ; qP ) : (40)
Also in this case, (37) makes clear that, under these hypotheses on the multi-
pliers, the Ramsey-like tangency condition (2) cannot be obtained, since (37)
is equal to (2) only when  = 0 which clearly contradicts the initial hypothesis
on its value.
Finally, assume  = 0 and  > 0. Using these into (27) and (28), and
rearranging, it gives
vp(p
; q)
vq(p; q)
=
p(p
; q)
q(p; q)
: (41)
Also, taking the limit for  ! 1 of (29) and (30) we get
(p; q)(T + 1)  b(p)  T(pP ; qP )  0; (42)
(p; q) = b  pP  : (43)
From (42) and (43) we get
T  b(p)  b  pP b (pP )   (pP ; qP ) : (44)
In this case, (p; q) = 0 implies that constraints (42) and (43) should be
read as
T    b(p)
 (pP ; qP )
; (45)
0 = b  pP  ; (46)
since b  pP  >   pP ; qP  by denition, then constraint (46) implies that a
positive T must be associated with 
 
pP ; qP

< 0.
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Despite the solutions in the dierent cases are not comparable with
each other, they may be compared against the second best solution. Since
contracts are stationary, there is no contract whose discounted present value
is higher than the one that ensures in each period the static second-best.
Hence, the unique solution to problem (23)-(26) is the one that obtains the
static second-best, i.e. the one obtained when  = 0 and  > 0.
Finally, notice that, when  ! 1, constraint (26) always holds.
The Proposition illustrates the features of the relational regulatory con-
tract that, when  tends to 1, maximises the regulator's objective function
when players use stick-and-carrot strategies as described before. The restric-
tion to the case when  approaches 1 is legitimate for two dierent reasons. In
the rst place, the purpose of the Section is to show the eect of a dierent
and more complex strategy (and a harsher punishment) on the impossibility to
reach the second best even with an innitely patient rm, which we obtained
in the case of grim trigger strategies. Second, the result is more general than
it seems; for reasons of continuity, there always exists a critical discount factor
suciently close to 1, but strictly lower than 1, such that our contract exists
for any discount factor greater than this critical level.
The Proposition illustrates that, when  tends to 1, the optimal regula-
tory relational contract secures a tangency condition between the regulator's
iso-welfare contours and the rm's isoprot; in other words, the regulatory con-
tract always ensures that the regulator and the rm face the same marginal
rate of substitution between price and quality. As already discussed, this is
one of the conditions that grants the socially optimality, a la Ramsey, of the
regulatory contract.
Also, the optimal regulatory relational contracts grants the second con-
dition for social optimality, namely zero prots to the rm when it adheres to
the contract. We show that an appropriate choice of the punishment phase
in case of deviation ensures this. Indeed, to this result, it is necessary not
only a long enough punishment phase (i.e. T above a critical level), but also
that the rm is inicted negative prots during the punishment phase. This
sheds light on one of our previous results which stated that, when the static
equilibrium used to punish the deviating rm ensured it positive prots, the
optimal contract chosen by a regulator using a grim trigger strategy could not
ensure the second best even with an innitely patient rm. We show here
that even a more \sophisticated" strategy , like the stick-and-carrot adopted
in this section by the regulator, is not enough by itself to ensure the second
best when  tends to 1; rather, it must also be the case that the regulator can
punish the rm with negative prots in case of a deviation. Notice that this
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possibility is somehow in contrast with what it is normally posited in most
of the regulation literature (even in dynamic games with a non-myopic rm,
see De Fraja and Iozzi, 2008) where, in the light of the nature of the goods
produced by the regulated rm, the regulator must make sure, even in ex-ante
terms, that the rm obtains non-negative prots in each period.
4.2 Imperfectly observable quality
In this Subsection, we study the case of a regulator being unable to perfectly
observe the quality choice of the rm. In previous Sections, quality was as-
sumed to be perfectly observable, albeit uncontractible; we now assume that
quality cannot be observed and that it is not always possible for the regula-
tor to infer the rm's quality choice by observing the market demand. For
ease of exposition, we concentrate in this Subsection on the case of a benev-
olent regulator, despite all our results hold true for more general regulator's
preferences.
We assume that demand depends on a stochastic consumers' preference
parameter, !. In every period, ! can have two possible realisations, ! and !,
which are i.i.d. over time. We let Probf! = !g =  and Probf! = !g = 1 ,
with these probabilities known by all parties.
The realised preference parameter, together with the quality level, de-
termines in each period the nature of the demand function, which may be
\high", xH(p; q;!), or \low", xL(p; q;!), where xH(p; q;!) > xL(p; q;!) for
any admissible price and quality pair. In particular, we assume that
x =
8<:
xH(p; q;!) if ! = ! and q > q 
xL(p; q;!) if

! = ! and q = q  or
! = ! and q  q 
(47)
This aims at describing in a simple way the case in which the demand
has a random component and this very feature makes it impossible to infer the
(unobservable) quality choice of the rm by the simple observation of demand.
In particular, notice that, while the occurrence of high demand implies that
the rm has chosen a quality level higher than its minimum, low demand may
occur either as a result of low quality or of the `low' preference parameter !.
This is clearly an extreme simplication, which however grants full tractability
of the model and allows us to focus directly on the features of the optimal
contract with noisy observation of the rm's behaviour.
Ex-post prots are now denoted by k(p; q;!) = xk(p; q;!)p  
c(xk(p; q;!); q) for k = L;H; similarly, the regulator objective function is given
by v(xk(p; q;!))  vk(p; q;!). Both players are assumed to be risk-neutral.
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As to the structure of the rm's prots, we make the following simpli-
fying assumption:
Assumption 1 For any admissible price p and any ! 2 f!; !g, the rm's
payos are
L(p; q ;!) > k(p; q;!) for any q 6= q : (48)
This assumption means that, for any possible price level, the rm gets higher
prots by reducing quality to its minimum level; in other words, bq(p;!) =
q   bq, for any possibile realisation of ! and any price level. This may be
justied by the high cost of quality and/or by a relatively small increase in
the consumers' demand due to an increase in the quality level.
Our repeated game with imperfect monitoring is given by an innite
repetition of the following stage game:
1. the regulator makes an oer F  fp0; q0g in which she asks the rm to
produce a good of quality q0 and sets the market price p0 at which the
good has to be sold;
2. the rm chooses whether or not to accept the contract: if the rm accepts
the contract, the game proceeds to the following stage; otherwise, it does
not produce, reservation payos ~ and ~V are collected and the game
ends;13
3. the rm chooses the actual quality level q00;
4. nature chooses the parameter ! 2 f!; !g and demand is realised;
5. the regulator and the rm observe and collect their own payos.
We rst study the equilibrium of the static game. When the rm
chooses its quality after the regulator's decision on the price, because of the
previous assumption, it chooses bq. In the previous stage, the regulator antic-
ipates the rm's choice of the lowest quality level and its eect both on the
rm's prots and the regulator's objective function, and solves
max
p
vL (p; bq) (49)
s.t. L (p; bq)  0:
Since vLp < 0 by assumption, the price that solves this problem, denoted with
pS, is the lowest price that satisfy the non-negativity constraints; formally,
13As in the previous Sections, we assume that the regulator's oer is such that the rm
undertakes production in each period, so that this stage of the game can be safely ignored
in the characterisation of the equilibrium.
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pS is the smallest solution with respect to p of L(p; bq) = 0. In other words,
the price that maximises the payo of a rst-mover regulator always induces
the rm to obtain zero prots. Had we illustrate this result with a gure
similar to Figure 2, we would have to draw the locus aa0 as a horizontal line.
Since the iso-welfare contours are upward increasing, the price and quality
combination which maximises social welfare is the one where this locus crosses
the zero-prot contour.
We now turn to the analysis of the repeated game. Typically, when
players are symmetric and the stage game is simultaneous, repeated games
with imperfect monitoring are solved by using symmetric public perfect equi-
librium (SPPE) as solution concept. A SPPE is a symmetric strategy prole in
which, at any point in time, players do not rely on their private information but
base their decisions on public history. When players use grim trigger strate-
gies, the equilibrium is obtained by using the so-called bang-bang property,
which ensures that it is possible to implement the optimal SPPE randomiz-
ing only between the two extremal points of the set of payos supported by
SPPE. The equilibrium has then the following features: in the \cooperative"
phase, both players coordinate on the \cooperative" action (which gives play-
ers the highest payos supported by SPPE) until an unfavourable realisation
of the imperfect monitoring parameter occurs. Once this public event occurs,
players coordinate on a public randomisation device and either jointly stay in
the \cooperative" phase or enter the \punishment" phase, which gives players
the lowest payos supported by SPPE (see, for instance, Amelio and Biancini,
2010).14
Unfortunately, due to the extensive form of the stage game, we cannot
apply these techniques here. In the repeated game with imperfect observabil-
ity described above, an equilibrium with, mutatis mutandis, the same features
as the one described in the previous paragraph would not be subgame per-
fect. Indeed, in case of low demand, the one-shot deviation principle would
be violated; the regulator would always have an incentive to \cheat" on the
randomisation device and defer the punishment phase of one period. To avoid
this and still obtain a result which has the avour of the above literature, we
therefore use the simplifying assumption that the regulator is ex-ante able to
commit to a given strategy during the course of play. In the literature, this is
sometimes rationalised as if the player(s) were substituted by an automaton,
which intuitively consists of an output function that assigns a (possibly mixed)
14Here and in the rest of this Subsection, the term \punishment" is used in an improper
way, since the \punishment" phase does not necessarily intends to punish a deviation but
it is instead a change of state aimed at providing the right incentives to the players.
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stage-game action to each state of the game (uniquely determined by the his-
tory of the game), and a transition function that determines the transitions
across states as a function of the outcomes of the stage game.15
We concentrate on the equilibrium resulting from the adoption of the
following strategies:
 regulator: the regulator/automaton begins the game by making to the
rm an oer FC . In the following repetitions of the game, if demand
has been \low", with probability  she starts oering her optimal static
contract FS forever after, while, with probability 1   , she continues
to oer FC . If demand has instead been \high", with probability  she
starts oering her optimal static contract FS forever after, while, with
probability 1  , she continues to oer FC ;
 rm: the rm chooses the quality qC as long as the history of the game
is such that no price and quality dierent from pC and qC was previously
chosen; otherwise, it reverts indenitely to its equilibrium strategy in
the stage game.
Then,  (respectively, ) is the probability of starting a \punishment" phase,
conditional on the realisation of \low" (respectively, \high") demand. In other
words, the mixed strategy to which the regulator commits envisages that she
chooses to begin a punishment phase with probabilities  and , depending
on the realisation of demand.16
Before proceeding with the analysis of the game, we introduce the
following denitions: v
 
pC ; qC
  vL  pC ; qC + (1   )vH  pC ; qC and
15There is large literature exploring the role of commitment in repeated games and its
eect on the players' payos (Atakan and Ekmekci, 2012a and 2012b; Cripps and Thomas,
1995; Garca Jurado and Gonzalez Daz, 2005). This literature is mainly interested either
in commitment emerging endogenously, for instance as a tool to establish a reputation, or
in the exogenous mechanisms which allow a player to commit, for instance delegation. We
do not pursue these lines of research and simply assume the ability of our rst-mover player
to commit. Along the lines illustrated above, this ability to commit may be motivated, for
instance, by the regulator being an agent of a fully informed principal (the government)
and/or having a very strict procedural code, or because of the regulator's attempt to build
a reputation of being \tough".
16In the SPPE of simultaneous dynamic games of imperfect information, players take
their actions coordinating on the outcome of a public randomisation device. Probabilities are
exogenously chosen to ensure the best \collective" outcome of the game. Here instead, due to
the extensive form of the constituent game, a public randomisation device is unnecessary and
it is simply sucient to assume that the rst mover uses a mixed strategy, with endogenously
determined probabilities, conditional on the history of the game. The second mover instead
uses a pure strategy, being perfectly able to observe any past action.
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
 
pC ; qC
  L  pC ; qC+(1 )H  pC ; qC. Also, to compact notation, we
write bL(p) = L(p; bq), so that we can write (p; bq)  bL(p)+(1 )bL(p) =bL(p).
First of all, notice that, for the above strategies to be an equilibrium,
we only need to make sure that protable deviations for the rm do not exist.
This is because, by assumption, the regulator/automaton will never deviate
from the established course of action of her strategy. We then turn to write the
rm's incentive compatibility constraint. To be able to write this constraint,
we rst concentrate on the expected current value of the rm's prots when it
adheres to the contract oered by the regulator and, using Abreu et al. (1986,
1990), we write them as the following recursive expression
C = 
 
pC ; qC

+ 



P + (1  )C+ (1  ) P + (1  )C	 (50)
Solving it for C and using the fact that P = 1
1 
L
 
pS; qS

= 0, one gets
C =
1
1  [(1  ) + (1  )(1  )] 
 
pC ; qC

: (51)
When the rms instead deviates from the contract, the expected current value
of its prots is given by the expression
D = bL(p) +  P + (1  )C : (52)
Incentive compatibility requires that C  D. Using (51), (52) and P = 0,
after some manipulations, we rewrite the incentive compatibility constraint as
follows
1
1  [(1  ) + (1  )(1  )] 
 
pC ; qC
  1
1  (1  )bL(p): (53)
It is straightforward to check that, given the regulator's commitment,
the pair of strategies described above are perfect equilibrium strategies, pro-
vided that the contract oered by the regulator satises the rm's incentive
compatibility constraint (53). Since there are typically many such contracts,
it is interesting to characterise the one that gives the regulator the highest
utility. To nd this, we rst write the present value of the regulator's payo
when the rm adheres to the oered contract:
V C = v
 
pC ; qC

+




V P + (1  )V C+ (1  ) V P + (1  )V C	 : (54)
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Solving it for V C and using the fact that V P  1
1 v
L
 
pS; qS

, one gets
V C =
1
1  [(1  ) + (1  )(1  )] v
 
pC ; qC

+
+

1  
 + (1  )
1  [(1  ) + (1  )(1  )]v
L
 
pS; qS

: (55)
Using these results, we can write the regulator's problem as follows:
max
pC ;qC ;;
V C(pC ; qC ; ; ) (56)
s.t.
1
1  [(1  ) + (1  )(1  )] 
 
pC ; qC
  1
1  (1  )bL  pC
(57)
plus the natural constraints on  and  to be such that ;  2 [0; 1].
From the solution of (56)-(57), next Proposition follows.
Proposition 5 Let p; q;  and  be the price/quality pair and the prob-
abilities of triggering a punishment phase that maximise social welfare when
the trigger strategies of the regulator/automaton and of the rm are an equi-
librium of the dynamic game with imperfect information. Then, provided that
  (p;q)bL(p) , the following hold
vp (p
; q)
vq (p; q)
=
p (p
; q)  (p;q)bL(p) bLp (p)
q (p; q)
(58)
 =  1  

1  (p;q)bL(p)
  (p;q)bL(p) (59)
 = 0 (60)
Proof Using (55) and only the relevant constraints on  and , we write the
Lagrangean of problem (56)-(57) as follows:
L =
1
1  [(1  ) + (1  )(1  )] v
 
pC ; qC

+

1  
 + (1  )
1  [(1  ) + (1  )(1  )]v
L
 
pS; qS

+ 

1
1  [(1  ) + (1  )(1  )] 
 
pC ; qC
  1
1  (1  )bL  pC

+ : (61)
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where  is the multiplier associated with constraint (57) and  is the one
associated with the non-negativity constraint on . FOCs are given by
Lp =
vp (p
; q) + p (p; q)
1  [(1  ) + (1  )(1  )]   
bLp (p)
1  (1  ) = 0 (62)
Lq =
vq (p
; q) + q (p; q)
1  [(1  ) + (1  )(1  )] = 0 (63)
L =


v (p; q)  vL  pS; qS+  (p; q)
(1  [(1  ) + (1  )(1  )])2   
bL(p)
[1  (1  )]2 = 0; (64)
L =
(1  ) v (p; q)  vL  pS; qS+  (p; q)
(1  [(1  ) + (1  )(1  )])2    = 0; (65)
L =
 (p; q)
1  [(1  ) + (1  )(1  )]  
bL(p)
1  (1  )  0;
  0; L = 0; (66)
L =   0;   0; L = 0: (67)
From (62) and (63), it follows that  > 0; if this were not the case, we would
have that vp (p
; q) = vq (p; q) = 0, which clearly contradicts the hypothesis
that the (ex-ante) rst best is out of reach. Therefore, L = 0 in (66).
From (65), since v (p; q) > vL
 
pS; qS

, it follows that  > 0. From
(67), this implies (60). Using this into L = 0, one obtains
1
1 (1 ) (p
; q) =
1
1 (1 )bL(p). Solving it w.r.to  gives (59); since  (p; q) < bL(p), this is
always dierent from 0 provided that  is dierent from 1. Also,  < (p
;q)bL(p)
ensures that  > 0.
Finally, using  = 0 into (62) and (63), these can be rewritten as
1
1  (1  ) vp (p
; q)
+ 

1
1  (1  ) p (p
; q)  1
1  (1  )bL(p)

= 0 (68)
1
1  (1  ) vq (p
; q) + 
1
1  (1  ) q (p
; q) = 0 (69)
from which, after a simple rearranging and using (59), we obtain (58).
Proposition 5 allows us to characterise the regulator's optimal strat-
egy. The regulator begins by oering a contract fp; qg. If the realisation
of demand is \high", this necessarily implies that the rm has delivered the
required quality level and then the regulator does not trigger the punishment
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phase. When the realization of demand is \low", the regulator switches to the
static optimal contract

pS; qS
	
with probability .
This equilibrium never exists when the probability of realisation of the
less favourable demand parameter is \too" high. The reason for this is clear
when one looks at the extreme case of  = 1; using this into the rm's incentive
compatibility constraint (57), this reduces to L
 
pC ; qC
  bL  pC, which
is clearly never satised. Indeed, when the probability of an unfavourable
realisation of demand is high, the probability that the regulator will start the
punishment phase is in turn high, so that the rm does not have an incentive to
adhere to the oered contract. The threshold value of  is (p
;q)bL(p) . This ratio,
which plays a fundamental role in the entire Proposition, is clearly always less
than one and gives an inverse measure of the static loss the rm faces when
adhering to the oered contract: when (p
;q)bL(p) is close to zero, the dierence
between the cooperative and the deviation prots is very large and, on the
other hand, the closer to 1 is the ratio, the smaller are the prots the rms
has to give up when adhering to the contract.
The probability of triggering the punishment phase, , provides the
rm the appropriate incentives to oer the contractual quality. The optimal
value of  also depends on the ratio (p
;q)bL(p) . The larger is the loss from coop-
eration (i.e., the smaller is the above ratio), the greater will be the incentive to
deviate from the oered contract, and therefore, the larger is the probability of
triggering the punishment phase when demand is low. A similar (but clearly
opposite) argument holds for the inverse relationship between  and . In the
limiting case of an innitely patient rm,  loses its incentive role and goes
down to zero; on the other hand, the more impatient is the rm, the greater is
the need to discipline it by a suciently large probability of \punishment"in
case of low demand.
Finally, (58) shows that the contract fp; qg is typically unable to
ensure the (ex-ante) second best, the distortion depending again on the ratio
(p;q)bL(p) . It is only in the limiting case of  ! 1 that the second best is achieved.
Indeed, when  tends to 1,  tends to 0 as well; taking the limit of both sides
of the (57), it results that this constraint is always satised. It is then natural
for the regulator to choose  (p; q) = 0 to minimise the rm's rent. This in
turn ensures that, in (58), the second best is achieved. It is however interesting
to note that the condition on  necessary for the existence of the equilibrium
constrains  to be equal to zero. In other words, to achieve the second-best,
it is not only necessary that the rm is innitely patient, but also that the
realisation of demand parameter is always high.
Leaving aside these extreme parametric conditions, it is interesting to
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note that, dierently from the other settings analysed in the paper, the dis-
tortion from the second best illustrated in (58) does not directly depend on
the discount factor. This is because, in the present setting, the appropriate
incentives to oer the contractual quality are mostly given by , which indeed
varies with .
4.3 Two-dimensional quality
In this Subsection we assume that the good has two dierent quality dimen-
sions, q and z, both fully observable by all parties. While q remains, as before,
not veriable, z is veriable. Demand is now given by x(p; q; z), while the
rm's cost function is c(x; q; z). The regulator's objective function is v(p; q; z).
Apart from veriability, all hypotheses on q are also valid for z.
The regulator's oer in Stage 1 is given by F  fp0; q0; z0g. In Stage
3, the rm chooses the quality levels q00 and z00; at the end of this stage the
regulator observes both quality dimensions and payos are collected. Quality z
is veriable in the sense that the regulator could impose a directly enforceable
penalty on the rm when she observes z0 6= z00; we assume this penalty to be
arbitrarily large, so that the rm never has an incentive to do so.
Let b(p; z)   (p; bq(p; z); z), where bq(p; z) denotes the rm's optimal
choice of q, for any given p and z. We also let pS and zS denote the price and
(veriable) quality oered by the regulator in equilibrium in the stage game.
Finally, we denote with pR, qR and zR the triplet of price and quality dimen-
sions which solves the (static) problem of maximising social welfare subject
to a non-negativity constraint on the rm's prots. At pR, qR and zR, the
following hold:
vp
 
pR; qR; zR

vq (pR; qR; zR)
=
p
 
pR; qR; zR

q (pR; qR; zR)
(70)
vz
 
pR; qR; zR

vq (pR; qR; zR)
=
z
 
pR; qR; zR

q (pR; qR; zR)
(71)
The structure of both the static and the dynamic game is very similar
to the case of quality being mono-dimensional and its full description is omit-
ted. Among the many possible self-enforcing regulatory relational contracts,
denoted as before as FC  pC ; qC ; zC	, we simply characterise here the struc-
ture of the optimal contract, F  fp; q; zg, which gives the highest payo
to the regulator when players use grim trigger strategies. This comes as the
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solution of the following problem:
max
pC ;qC ;zC
1
1   v
 
pC ; qC ; zC

(72)
s.t.
1
1  
 
pC ; qC ; zC
  b(p; z) + 
1  b(pS; zS) (73)
We can then state the following Proposition:
Proposition 6 When players use grim trigger strategies and quality has two
dimensions, the price and quality combination fp; q; zg solving problem (72)-
(73) has the following properties:
 it satises the following conditions:
vp(p
; q; z)
vq(p; q; z)
=
p(p
; q; z)  (1  )bp(p; z)
q(p; q; z)
(74)
vz(p
; q; z)
vq(p; q; z)
=
z(p
; q; z)  (1  )bz(p; z)
q(p; q; z)
(75)
and
(p; q; z) = (1  )b(p; z) + b(pS; zS); (76)
 the optimal unveriable quality q is always set to satisfy the static
quality-adjusted Ramsey condition, given the optimal price and veriable
quality.
The proofs of this and next Proposition are very similar to the ones
of Proposition 2 and 3 and are therefore omitted. Conditions (74), (75) and
(76) are also very similar to the ones presented in Proposition 2, when quality
was mono-dimensional and entirely unveriable, and most of the discussion
provided there applies here too. The main result of this analysis is instead
the last part of Proposition 6, which conrms the dichotomy result we obtain
in the previous section: the optimal relational contract create a distortion
only on the veriable components of the rm's output. Indeed, we nd that
both the price and the veriable quality dimensions are distorted away from
the second best to give the rm enough incentives to adhere to the contact,
while the unveriable component of quality is set to the second-best level
(given the level of the other components of the output). Notice that, since
this result only depends on the demand and cost rst derivatives, it does not
depend on the complementarity or substitability relationship between the two
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quality component, which typically aect the second order demand and cost
derivatives.
We also consider the case of consumers with quasi-linear preferences
and of an utilitarian regulator, as in Section 3.3. In a perfect analogy with
the case of quality being monodimensional, next Proposition presents, for the
case of multidimensional quality, what we have already dened as a formula
for relational Ramsey pricing:
Proposition 7 Assume consumers have quasi-linear preferences and the reg-
ulator is a benevolent utilitarian. When players use grim trigger strategies and
quality has two dimensions, the optimal contractual price satises
p   cx(x(p; q; z); q; z)
p
=
1
(p; q; z)

  1

  (1  ) bp(p; z)
x(p; q; z)

:
5 Conclusions
This paper tackles the issue of how regulatory authorities might induce a
regulated rm to deliver unveriable (then ex ante not contractible) quality.
Although the recent literature has successfully showed that enforcing a so-
cially optimal level of quality is possible by incorporating some sophisticated
instruments, we show that the main problem of unveriability could be eased
by a standard (easy to apply) xed-price contract. Our paper denes the opti-
mal xed-price contract the regulator needs to oer a regulated rm when the
quality is endogenous, observable but not veriable. We suggest that, using
the discretionary powers of the regulator and exploiting the repeated nature
of the interaction between the regulator and the rm, there exist self-enforcing
relational agreements which may help overcoming the diculties due to the
unveriable nature of quality. We show that, in an innitely repeated contrac-
tual relation, if the regulator rewards the rm by means of a high regulated
price when it delivers a mandated quality level and punishes it by reducing
the price in future periods when it deviates from such a level, the optimal
relational contract improves upon the static equilibrium level. This contract
however typically entails distortions from the quality and price of second best,
unless the punishment is so harsh to induce zero or negative prot. Adding a
further source of ineciency such as the impossibility for the regulator to per-
fectly monitor the rm's quality choices makes the second best price/quality
pair out of reach even with an innitely patient rm.
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